This paper studies the price structure in a postal sector with a monopolistic operator when customers can engage in worksharing. It presents simulation results obtained from an empirical model that is calibrated on data from the French postal sector. The optimal worksharing discount is significantly larger than the avoided costs. Consequently, the appropriate pricing structure differs markedly from the often recommended ECPR policy.
Introduction
The practice of worksharing has been introducing a measure of competition in the postal sector, even when the industry was otherwise monopolistic. Processing workshared mail at a discounted rate is effectively like providing the client with access to one or several segments of the postal network. Like in the case of downstream access, the postal operator sells some products which use only part of its network, while other products use the entire network. Put differently, the postal sector has the specific feature that access is a relevant issue even when there are no competing operators in the market. This feature raises the question how the workshared product ought to be priced and more generally, how the possibility of worksharing ought to affect the operators pricing structure. The underlying * Contact author. Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI, GREMAQ), University of Toulouse, Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France. E-mail: etienne.devillemeur@univ-tlse1.fr. We thank Frédérique Fève for her research assistance and Philippe De Donder for his detailed comments. We also would like to thank Paul Kleindorfer and an anonymous referee for their comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily respect the views of La Poste theoretical issues raised by this subject have been extensively studied in the literature, see Billette de Villemeur et al (2002 , 2003 . 1 The structure of prices has to be reconsidered when the market opens. Competition may take two different forms. First, once entry has occurred, the demand for workshared mail may in part emanate from the competing operators. Specifically, the entrant may have all or part of its mail delivered by the incumbent (for an access charge), rather than build its own delivery network. In that case, competition is limited to the upstream segments (mail preparation, etc.) . Second, the entrant may find it optimal to "bypass" the incumbent's network in some areas by setting up its own delivery network. Now, competition affects all segments and the ability of the incumbent to cover its fixed costs may be more seriously undermined. The possibility of bypass limits the possibility to have the entrant's product contribute towards universal service costs and pricing rules will have to be amended. The incumbent's pricing policy will be modified accordingly and one can expect a rather significant impact. The determination of the structure and the levels of pricing in settings that combine worksharing, access and bypass has been studied by Panzar (2005) as well as in our earlier papers (see Billette de Villemeur et al (2004 , 2005 ).
All these studies are essentially of theoretical nature. They provide optimal pricing rules and many qualitative arguments that are useful in the regulatory debate and lead to valuable policy recommendations. However, such studies are not suitable to address a number of more specific and quantitative questions. For instance, they do not tell us what would be the order of magnitude of price adjustments and welfare changes across scenarios and policies. They do tell us that optimal prices usually differ from those stipulated by ECPR; 2 they do not tell us by how much, nor do they quantify the welfare loss (and the impact on the operator's profit) associated with such an ad hoc rule. The theoretical investigations show that the financial viability "may" be challenged in some case but they fail to determine how serious a threat this would represent.
To address such quantitative issues, an empirical implementation of the theoretical model is required. This paper represents a first step in that direction. We present a calibrated specification of Billette de Villemeur et al (2002, 2003) based on real (albeit normalized) data from the French postal sector. For the time being, we study only the monopoly scenarios while leaving the empirical study of competitive settings presented in Billette de Villemeur et al (2004 Villemeur et al ( , 2005 for future research. In addition to the scenarios considered in Billette de Villemeur et al (2002 Villemeur et al ( , 2003 we consider a number of other regulatory scenarios: ECPR, price of single piece mail fixed at an exogenous ("affordable") level, profit maximization, etc. The most interesting questions associated with these scenarios are of quantitative nature. They have therefore been neglected in the earlier theoretical models but can be now addressed in our calibrated model.
One of the most original features of our earlier investigations was the specification of the "demand model". We have explicitly modeled the heterogeneity between business customers that differ in the characteristics of their demand (level and elasticity) and in their preparation cost. Our current study involves the estimation of the distribution of preparation cost and this turned out to be a most challenging exercise. This demand model will be an important ingredient in future studies of additional regulatory scenarios.
Model
The basic model is closely inspired by Billette de Villemeur et al (2002 Villemeur et al ( , 2003 with some generalizations. To make the paper self-contained and to avoid cumbersome cross referencing, we have to repeat some of the features of the original model. The stylized postal network we consider consists of two segments. Segment 1 corresponds to a composite activity including collecting, sorting and transportation. This activity implies a constant marginal cost of 1 c . Segment 2 is delivery with marginal cost of 2 c . In addition, there is a fixed cost of F . Throughout the paper, we assume that there is a single operator.
There are two types of customers and two goods. The h n customers of type h (households) consume good x which uses both segments. The marginal cost of x is thus given by 1 2 c c + . The f n customers of type f (firms) may or may not use segment 1 of the operator's network. If they do not use segment 1, they consume good z which implies a marginal cost of
⎦ This says that there are both, clients that have lower collecting, sorting and transportation costs than the operator; and clients that are less efficient than the operator in preparing their mail. Observe that k is directly born by the client while 2 c is the operator's cost. Alternatively, firms can consume good x for which they pay the same price as households. 4 Observe that households are assumed identical for simplicity. Firms on the other hand, may differ not only in the cost of preparing mail but also in their willingness to pay. The variable k thus plays two roles: it is the cost of segment 1 and also a parameter which determines willingness to pay (surplus). Throughout the paper, we assume that a lower k implies a lower cost and a higher willingness to pay. In other words, bigger clients are also relatively more efficient in preparing their mail than small firms.
Net surplus is obtained by subtracting total cost: payment to the operator plus cost of activity 1, if applicable. We can then define the following demand functions:
Observe that we have two classes of demand functions for x : one for households and one for each type of firms. Substituting demand functions into net surplus yields the following indirect utility functions:
,
Except for the cost difference, ξ and ζ are considered as perfect substitutes. 4 For simplicity, we use surplus as a welfare measure for firms. This can be understood as representing the surplus of the consumers who buy the goods produced by firms φ which use postal services as inputs. One can easily show that our shortcut does not involve any loss of generality in the case where all downstream markets are competitive (that is, all firms who consume mail sell their products in competitive markets). 
Second-best
The policy that maximizes social welfare subject to the operators' break-even constraint is defined by
where ˆX ε and ˆZ ε are the "superelasticities" of the demand for goods x and z. These "superelasticities" are modified price elasticities of demand which account for substitution between the two goods. It can be shown that ˆX X ε ε < and ˆZ Z ε ε < , that is that the superelasticities are smaller than the respective ordinary elasticity.
A direct consequence of equations (4) and (5) is that, the worksharing decision is no longer (production) efficient. This is because the worksharing discount % = x z k p p − is likely to differ from 1 c . More precisely, we have
In words, the demand for z being more elastic, we should obtain a worksharing discount that exceeds the marginal cost of access. In our empirically application, we can test the relevance of this theoretical prediction.
Efficient component pricing rule
In contrast to the second-best policy, the ECPR doctrine requires productive efficiency hence a worksharing discount that equals the operators marginal cost (
. The original rule, however, does not specify the levels of prices. For the sake of comparison with the second-best policy, we will define ECPR by both ( ) ( )
where % X Z ε + is an "aggregate" demand elasticity, defined over the entire postal market:
Observe that, while ECPR policy guarantees efficient worksharing, it ignores "allocative inefficiencies" that arise when prices are set above marginal costs. Since it precludes exploiting the trade-offs between the two sources inefficiencies (productive and allocative), there are potential benefits from relaxing the "Efficient Cost Pricing Rule". In other words, ECPR is not in general second-best efficient.
Regulatory scenarios
Our model can be used to study the market equilibrium in a monopolistic market under a variety of assumptions regarding the consumer characteristics, the production costs and the regulatory environment. In this paper, we consider two broad classes of regulatory environments. In the first one, the price x p for single-piece mail is considered as exogenously given (for instance, because of political economy constraints). It is set at its (normalized) current value o x p . The regulator sets z p according to a welfare objective, possibly subject to a number of constraints. In the second class of problems, both x p and z p are endogenous. For each of these two settings, we consider four alternative scenarios. In the first one, which is (with some abuse) labeled FB for "first-best", the relevant problem is to maximize welfare (total surplus) without imposing a break even constraint for the operator. In other words, we suppose that a possible deficit can be covered by a subsidy from the government (that is, financed by a lump-sum tax and involves no "cost of public funds"). Observe that, while FB is effectively the first-best allocation when both x p and y p are endogenous, it is of course not in general first-best efficient when x p is arbitrarily fixed. The second scenario, which is labeled ECPR for "Efficient Component Pricing Rule", is obtained as explained in Subsection 2.1.3: the worksharing discount ( ) x z p p − equals avoided cost 1 c and the operator must break even. The third scenario, which is labeled SB for "Second-best", is a Ramsey type solution. It is obtained by maximizing welfare subject to the operator's break-even constraint. Observe that the scenarios ECPR and SB both imply break-even so that their comparison is particularly interesting. Finally we consider a scenario, labeled max Π , under which the operator maximizes profits; there are no regulatory constraint except possibly the restriction imposed on the price of single-piece mail, x p .
Calibration

SP: Nature of the calibration exercise
The results presented in this paper are obtained from simulations of a calibrated version of our model. The calibrations are based on real data from "La Poste" (that we combine with some stylized facts). However, for obvious confidentiality reasons, the reported numbers have been normalized and the "starting point" ( SP ) suitably modified. More precisely, prices and costs are expressed as a function of the single piece price x p which is set to 1. The number of worksharing firms is set to 500. The traffic flows are such that the total volume of mail amounts to 10, 000 (millions of items) at ; SP their relative share reflects the arbitrary choice of the prices o x p and o z p but entails no precise relationship with the current situation. On the other hand, the variations of the operator's profit induced by the various changes in prices are expressed in terms of their actual units, namely in millions of euros. This is also the case of variations in consumer surplus and social welfare.
The advantage of adopting such an approach is that, despite the numerous normalizations, the qualitative outcomes of the various scenarios are absolutely unchanged. In particular, all the relative changes are exactly preserved. Moreover, the results in terms of profits and welfare variations are the exact outcomes of the model. In other words, while avoiding the disclosure of confidential information, we are nevertheless able to go beyond the purely fictitious exercise and deliver a clear and precise assessment of the implications of different policies.
Demand and elasticity of the different market segments
Before turning to the main figures on the French postal market, let us briefly present the demand model that is underlying the calibration exercise. Since the focus of the paper is worksharing, households (who, anyway, do not workshare) are represented in the simplest possible way. More precisely, there is a representative household whose (aggregate) demand function is assumed to be linear and given by
By contrast, the underlying model for firms' demand for mail is much more sophisticated. Depending on the prices x p and z p of both goods and on its own preparation cost , k each firm buys the commodity x or . z Each of the firm's demand functions is assumed to be linear in price:
However, since the decision to buy either x or z depends on the comparison between x p and z p k + the firm's behavior is highly non-linear.
Note also that the parameters of these functions (like their counterparts in the general model (1b) and (1c) are indexed by ; k consequently, demand functions are firm (or rather type) specific. More precisely, we shall assume that a firm's demand and its demand elasticity (in absolute value) are inversely related to its level of k . In other words, customers with a low preparation cost are those with the highest and most elastic demands.
Calibrations are made by using both traffic flows and elasticity estimates of the different market segments, that is, households, (small) firms that consume the commodity x and (large) firms that consume commodity z. More precisely, in our model the aggregate demand functions are given by The price elasticity of the firms' aggregate demand for x and z are given by
While precise information on demand levels is available, there is no information on price elasticities at the firms' level (even for firms of type
. We thus have to set a priori a distribution of elasticities k ε that verifies the system of equations (12) and (13).
This lack of information for firms' elasticities is at the origin of our choice to rely on functional forms for the demand functions and for the density ( ). ε is constrained to be monotonous decreasing in k . In other words, we voluntarily restrict our attention to distributions of k ε that guarantee, at the firms level, the larger clients are also the more sensitive to price changes. The range of elasticities
is also imposed from the outset.
Finally, observe that in both equations (12) and (13), firms with a low level of k tend to be given a higher weight. This explains why aggregate (market segment) demand elasticities will be larger than the average (individual) demand elasticities. It is worth keeping this observation in mind when discussing the values of elasticities that we adopt for this calibration.
Costs and market share distribution
Equations (10)- (11) and (12)- (13) like most other subsequent expressions depend on the density function ( ).
g k We adopt the following specification for the distribution function ( ) G k from which the density is derived:
where k is the upper-bound of the cost parameter k ; in other words, the support of the distribution is [0, ] k 6 . The parameters , γ σ and ρ are adjusted to match simultaneously (i) the expected profile of the cost k distribution, (ii) the actual number of worksharing firms, (iii) the anticipated number of worksharing firms if the discount were equal to the avoided costs and (iv) the data for the different market segments as given by aggregate demands and price-elasticities. As shown in Figure 1 , the sorting costs k are asymmetrically distributed. More precisely, ( ) g k is an increasing function which means that the lower is , k the smaller is the number of firms that are able to prepare their mail at that specific cost. The total number of firms is fixed at = 250, 000. N The number of worksharing firms
represented by the vertical blue line) is arbitrarily set at 500, that is 0.2% of the total number of firms. We also assume that, if the discount were four times larger, so as to equate avoided costs (as represented by the vertical red line), the number of worksharing firms
NG c would be ten times larger (but yet represents only 2% of the total number of firms). It is a well-known feature of the industry that, although the customers who potentially workshare their mail constitute only a small fraction of firms, their demand represents a significant share of total mail volume. The distribution of demand is depicted in Figure 2 . Colors are chosen as in Figure 1 so that the yellow curve represents the density function while the green curve represents the cumulative distribution function. Figure 2 makes it clear that roughly one fourth of the total demand originates from the 500 firms that currently workshare their mail. The share of total mail that is sent by the 5000 firms with the lowest preparation costs is estimated to be twice as large.
Further details on the specification of the parameters of the model are given in Appendix. We now turn to the presentation of the results. 6 In the theoretical model, we have previously assumed that k = ∞ . For practical purposes, we have truncated the estimated distributions. This has no impact on the results. 
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Scenarios with an exogenously fixed price for single-piece mail
We first consider the case where the regulatory policy takes the form of an exogenously fixed price for single-piece mail. Furthermore, we assume that the price x p remains at its initial level: = .
o x x p p The price z p that will prevail at equilibrium depends on the considered scenario. A full characterization of the market equilibria is reported in Table 1 , where SP (for starting point) refers to the initial situation, while FB, ECPR, SB, and max Π refer to the different regulatory scenarios just described.
Sc.
= c . Specifically, the optimal value of z p implies that the worksharing discount is more than 2.5 times the avoided cost and the operator makes a margin 2 0.127 z p c − = per unit of Z . As a result, about 32% of the firms do workshare while productive efficiency would reduce this share to 2%. Yet, consumption per worksharing firm Z N is reduced to 0.1 (to be compared to 1.5 at the "true" first-best, that is, when 1 1 2 p c c = + and 2 2 p c = ). Overall, this allocation would allow to improve upon SP in terms of welfare by about 450 million euros, which is 142 million less than what would allow shifting to the FB with endogenous x p . Recall, however, that both situations would yield a deficit for the operator.
ECPR: Efficient component pricing rule
ECPR, though not second-best optimal, is very commonly recommended by policy makers. According to this rule, the difference between single-piece mail and industrial mail is exactly equal to the avoided cost 1 ( = ). p the resulting price for industrial mail is exactly 80% of the single-piece rate. In other words, the current discount of 5% is well below its ECPR level. Recall that, by definition, ECPR induces efficient worksharing. The comparison with the current situation shows that the proportion of firms that effectively engage in worksharing (namely, 0.2% ) is lower than required by productive efficiency. In other words, the same volume of mail could be processed at a lower total cost if more firms were incited to engage in worksharing. Observe however that, since ECPR does not account for pricing or allocative inefficiency, this does not provide any indication as to whether or not worksharing discount should be increased or not from its current level. Overall, this allocation would yield a welfare improvement with respect to SP of about 330 million euros. However, imposing both ECPR along with = o x x p p would again result in negative profits for the operator.
SB: Second-best
It is well known that when (second-best) welfare rather than just cost efficiency is considered, optimal prices differ (in general) from those stipulated by the ECPR rule. This is also the case in our simulations. In the SB case, the price for industrial mail is = 0.850 z p so that the worksharing discount equals 0.150. Here, the optimal discount is thus 75% of the avoided cost. This result is due to the fact that x p is exogenously given and the intuition for it is the same as in Subsection 5.1: there is a trade-off between productive and allocative inefficiencies. If x p were also endogenous, the optimal discount associated to the SB case would exceed the avoided costs (See Billette de Villemeur et al (2003) ). Here, the worksharing discount is lower than the avoided cost because x p is exogenously fixed below the "true second-best" level (as defined in Subsection 6.3). This also explains why z p is higher than the level it takes in Subsection 6.3.
Our results also have other interesting implications. In particular, they show that it would be possible to maintain the price x p at its current level while decreasing the price z p by about 10% from its current level without endangering the operator's financial viability.
To be more precise, such a decrease in the price z p would double the industrial mail volume and this would more than compensate for the decrease in price. Consequently, the lower price would effectively result in higher profits in the industrial mail segment. Note, however, that such a decrease of z p implies a worksharing discount three times larger than its current level. This makes worksharing more attractive so that the number of firms that sort their mail is more than four times higher than its current level. It nevertheless continues to represent a very small fraction (less than 1% ) of the total number of firms. As a result, firms' demand for X drops by 57% and the profits in this market segment decrease accordingly. Overall, this adjustment of the price structure would not modify the profitability of the operator but result in an increase in consumer surplus of 2.75%, which represents a sizeable welfare gain of about 276 million euros. This is 58 million less than the gains that would follow from applying "constrained ECPR" allocation presented at the previous section. However, the later result came at a cost of 130 million deficit for the operator.
Finally, observe that the multiplier associated with the operator's break even constraint of the firm is = 0.68 λ under this scenario. In other words, an additional euro raised by the firm imposes a welfare cost of 1 = 1.68 λ + euros on the consumer. This yields a deadweight loss that is well above the usual estimates for the "marginal cost of public fund" that is, for France, in the range of 0.2 0.3. − Consequently, it would be efficient to pay a lump sum subsidy to the operator (financed through the general budget) as compensation for the imposed low level of . 
Profit-maximization
If the regulatory policy is limited to guaranteeing an "affordable" price to households, (that is, the only constraint imposed on the firm is o x x p p ≤ ), a profit maximizing operator will set the price for industrial mail to 0.907. z p = This means that it would effectively be profitable for the firm to decrease its price z p by 4.5%. This corresponds to an increase of about 86% in the worksharing discount (that would nevertheless remain below the avoided cost). As a result, the number of worksharing firms would increase by 81% while the workshared mail would increase by 60%. Of course, this increase in cash-flow from the industrial market segment is mitigated by a decrease of revenues from the single-piece market by 22%. Overall, the net increase on profits is positive but represents only 2% of the fixed costs. However, the corresponding variation in total welfare would amount to 165 million euros. In other words, a less rigid pricing policy (giving the operator the option to decrease its price and to increase the worksharing discount) would boost social welfare by more than half of the total potential gains (that is, the gains achieved by switching from the current prices to the second-best solution).
Flexible price scenarios
We now reconsider the same four scenarios for the case where both prices, x p and z p can be adjusted. The numerical results are reported in 
FB: Social welfare maximization without budget constraint
The unrestricted first-best solution yields, of course, marginal cost pricing so that 0.550
While the numbers we report are obtained from simulation, this specific result can, of course, also be established analytically (see Billette de Villemeur et al (2003) ). These authors also point out that the solution implies efficient worksharing that is customers of type f engage in worksharing whenever
Our simulations are (fortunately) also consistent with this result. This level of worksharing discount implies that about 2% of the firms would prepare their mail.
As compared to the current situation, mail volumes would increase by 29% for customers of type f (firms) and by 9% for customers of type h (households). As a result, there would be a social welfare improvement of about 600 million euros. However, operator's revenues cover only marginal costs so that there is a deficit that corresponds to the level of fixed cost F . Consequently, to reestablish the operators' current profit level, a government subsidy that represents about 50% of the current cash-flow would be required.
ECPR: Efficient component pricing rule
When both prices x p and z p are endogenous, the ECPR does not provide a unique solution. Recall that according to this rule, the difference between the price of single-piece mail and that of industrial mail is set equal to the avoided cost (
. This imposes a (linear) restriction on pricing rules, but leaves one degree of freedom. To remove this ambiguity, we assume that the operator is requested to adopt the ECPR price structure and to make zero-profits. The resulting prices are = 1.025
In other words, the price for single-piece mail should be slightly increased ( 2.5% + ) while pre-sorted mail should become much cheaper ( 13% − ) so that its price would be about 82% of the singlepiece rate (as compared to a current ratio of 95% ). In other words, it appears that the current discount is equal to 25% of its ECPR level. Recall that by definition, the ECPR implies efficient worksharing. As compared to the current situation, the mail volume is almost unchanged. It would increase by about 5% for firms and would slightly decrease for households (less than 1% ). By contrast, the structure of traffic is completely modified. The workshared volume more than doubles while firms' demand for single-piece mail is divided by more than three. 
SB: Second-best
The SB scenario we consider is in the Ramsey tradition: prices are set to maximize social welfare subject to the operator's break-even constraint. Interestingly, the optimal SB prices, namely 1.058
x p = and 0.805 z p = , differ from those obtained under ECPR. This is so even though we have defined the ECPR to yield the same level of profits (namely, zero). The SB solution implies that the price for single-piece mail should be increased by +6% while pre-sorted mail should be reduced by about 15% with respect to SP prices. Observe that SB prices are further away from current prices than are the ECPR prices. Consequently, a switch from SP to SB on the one hand and a switch from SP to ECPR on the other hand yield price variations along the same directions but of different magnitude. Specifically, the adjustment is more significant for a switch to SB. Furthermore, the results show that the worksharing discount would be multiplied by 5 if SB were adopted. As a result, the number of firms that sort their mail would be multiplied by 20, the industrial mail volume be multiplied by almost 2.5, while firms' demand for X would drop by more than 75%. Overall, the switch to the SB prices would increase consumer surplus by 3% which corresponds again to a total variation of about 300 million euros.
Shifting from ECPR to SB may appear to induce only minor price changes. Nevertheless, there are quite significant differences between the two scenarios. First, in the SB scenario, the worksharing decision would no longer be (production) efficient. As shown by Billette de Villemeur et al (2003) , the worksharing discount now exceeds the avoided cost. Our numerical results are consistent with this property and furthermore show the number of worksharing firms is about twice as large under SB than under ECPR. Second, the traffic in Z would increase by 7% while firms' demand for X would drop by 27%. Finally, losses in terms of production efficiency (as a result of a too high number of worksharing firms) are offset by gains in (gross) surplus, associated with the more suitable pricing structure (that better fits the differences in elasticities across consumers). The effect of prices on demand is typically neglected by ECPR that focus on the sole cost dimension. However, by taking them into account, that is, by shifting from ECPR to SB, the regulator could enhance social welfare by 7 million euros.
Finally, observe that the multiplier of the break even constraint, λ is now equal to 0.23, a level that is within the range of conventional estimates for the overall marginal cost of public funds. Consequently, the case for a subsidy from the general budget can no longer be made when all prices are endogenous. Put differently, the subsidy discussed in Subsection 5.3 is effectively a "compensation" for the cap on the price of single-piece mail.
Profit-maximization
A profit-maximizing (monopolistic) operator will set the price for industrial mail at = 1.632 z p . This means that it would effectively be profitable for the firm to increase this price by 71% . Moreover, the optimal price for single-piece mail would be multiplied by more than three. The worksharing discount is higher than the avoided cost and we end up with a situation where all firms engage in worksharing. As a result, firms' demand for X disappears. Compared to the current situation, the mail volumes would decrease by 36% for firms and 45% for households. Those changes would lead to a loss of 2.6 billion euros in social welfare. These results are quite extreme but do not come as a surprise. It is well known that a profit-maximizing monopolistic operator who is not subject to the appropriate regulatory constraints would tend to set prices that are higher than socially optimal. The added feature we get from the numerical results is that in the postal sector this would lead to very significant adjustments. Also observe that the monopoly setting is crucial here. Under competition, we can expect the profit-maximizing solution to perform "much better".
Conclusion
We have studied the price structure that would prevail in the postal sector under a number of alternative regulatory scenarios. There is a single operator that provides services to households (single piece, end-to-end mail) and to business customers (who may have the option of worksharing their mail). We have determined the optimal prices and studied the implications of various policies in terms of (mail) volumes, profits and welfare. The results were obtained from simulations based on an empirical model. This model is a calibrated version of the setting introduced by Billette de Villemeur et al (2002 Villemeur et al ( , 2003 ; calibrations were based on real (albeit normalized) data from the French postal sector. The (socially) optimal worksharing discount was shown to be significantly larger than the avoided costs (more than 25%). Consequently, the number of firms that effectively engage in worksharing firms is larger (about five times) than the (production) efficient level. The welfare gain (over and above the reference scenario) that would result from the implementation of such a policy was estimated at approximately 311 million euros. Interestingly, this "Ramsey pricing" scenario has been shown to differ significantly from the often recommended ECPR policy. If the operator were to offer a discount exactly equal to its avoided costs and otherwise set prices to break-even, the number of worksharing firms would be about half of that prevailing with the socially optimal policy. The structure of mail volumes, as distributed over the different products would also be significantly different. However, in term of social welfare, the difference did not appear to be very significant (7 million euros).
We have also shown that an application of ECPR combined with the current price of single piece mail o x p does not appear to be feasible as the operator would not break-even. However, it would be possible to maintain x p at its current level and decrease the price of z p (by about 10%) without changing the operator profits. This result was explained by the fact that the induced increase in demand would totally compensate for the reduced margin over the commodity Z. Such a change would allow welfare to improve by about 275 million euros. Consequently the cost of maintaining x p at its current level implies a welfare (efficiency) cost of about 35 million euros. Recall, however, that capping the price of single piece mail can be justified on "redistributive" grounds (See, for example, Billette de Villemeur et al 2002). Finally, in that scenario, given the usual estimates for the "marginal cost of public fund", there is a case to subsidize the operator.
Households have a quasi-linear quadratic utility function where the utility of mail is specified as: 
( )=
.
Firms
Like for households, we specify a quasi-linear quadratic utility function so that firm's demand functions are linear in prices. Apart from the cost dimension, workshared mail Z is a perfect substitute to single-piece mail X. Consequently, preferences are represented by a single utility function for both goods. If single-piece mail X is purchased, the price to be considered is simply .
x p If product Z is consumed, the "price" to be considered is the sum of z p and the sorting cost k for the firm. Formally, 
F c c
Although the value of 1 c and 2 c has been rounded in order not to unveil their exact ratio, model outcomes shall mirror quite faithfully the exact consequences of the various scenarios. This is because the calibration of "the demand model" is not affected by changes in the operator's costs. In contrast, the collection and sorting costs , k as supported by worksharing firms, do impact the demand by firms. To obtain a faithful representation of demand characteristics, we did not adjust the customers' costs. This functional form allows us to match all essential characteristics of the postal sector. In particular, the density function appears to be increasing, reflecting high market concentration.
Distribution of sorting costs
There is very few (direct) evidence in order to determine the distribution of costs NG k NG p p − % However, since the collecting and sorting cost k is assumed to be monotonically related to the demand levels, we may get some (indirect) evidence by collecting information about individual demands. This explains why the calibration exercise consists in a joint estimation of costs and demand parameters. , c c and F are adjusted accordingly. Demand for all products is computed for this modified price structure and total demand h f X X Z + + is normalized to 100,000 objects. As already mentioned, given the highly non-linear behavior of firms' demand, this means that effective mail volumes cannot be retrieved from the reported SP values.
Observe that the accuracy of the various scenarios is not affected by these adjustments. Normalizations occur after the calibration stage. Consequently, they do not impact the outcome of the model. In particular, variations in surplus, profits and welfare are not affected.
